Criticism
Volume 59 | Issue 2

2017

Orbit Around A Void
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
Case Western Reserve University, jdb179@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism
Recommended Citation
Bendik-Keymer, Jeremy (2017) "Orbit Around A Void," Criticism: Vol. 59 : Iss. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/criticism/vol59/iss2/8

Article 8

ORBIT AROUND A
VOID
Jeremy Bendik-Keymer
Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany,
Cute, Interesting by Sianne Ngai.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2012. Pp. 333;
44 halftones, 4 line illustrations.
$20.50 paper.

“Now I’m happy for a time and
interested”: a state of being “interested,” a disposition to prefer one
thing to another, replaces definite
interests and consistent preferences . . . . He’s shopping without
a list.”1
Walter Benjamin’s Arcades Project
(Passagenwerk, 1927–40) led readers into the dream underside of
everyday life in the heyday of
bourgeois capitalism. Benjamin’s
high modernist notebook assumes
both a comfort with formal gesture
and the antisocial solitude of the
European high literary reader of
the early twentieth century, a person comfortable with the indirection of posited and disconnected
things at the level of the text. Sianne
Ngai’s Our Aesthetic Categories similarly plunges her reader into the
dream underside of everyday life
in our heyday of global capitalism,
but hers is a plain style that feels
personal, comfortable, and fluid—
almost chatty. True to her training
with Stanley Cavell, her style is at
home in the ordinary, not wandering as the flâneur in the extraordinary. Hers is an approachable,
infectious book, written around
a set of tightly argued theses. Yet,
Our Aesthetic Categories is an heiress of the Arcades Project.
Like Ngai, Benjamin thought
we can unlock the meaning of quotidian things from the perspective
of the tensions generated in them
through their relation to the formal
causes of capitalism. It may seem
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strange to invoke the Aristotelian
notion of formal cause to explain
Benjamin’s work, but one of his core
assumptions is that the dynamics of
capitalism literally form the way
things appear in our world, straight
down to their contradictions—and
to the utopian possibility of overturning them. The mass-manufactured angel that even a poor
wretch could buy under the translucent glass of an arcade in the 8th
arrondissement grants a small piece
of forgetting to end the long day of
work and to assuage the children
who sense their parents’ anxiety
over the next rent due. This forgetting is also a reminder of the higher
order of noncalculative things once
solid, now melting into air. Yet the
manufactured quality of the trinket reduces its dreams to clichés.
Stamped on the product is the formal quality of capitalism: exhausting what it can use, spreading its
wares to all, dividing and maintaining class distinctions, reducing
the order of what is in itself good,
and deadening ideals through the
appearance of their alienation from
us.2 Benjamin’s brilliance is to teach
a way of experiencing everyday
objects that includes their wider
productive context, social relations
and all.
Ngai’s thesis is that our forms
of judgment similarly betray the
formal causes of capitalism in our
current round of global restructuring. She thinks our minds are
made up, too. Yet, just as Benjamin

liberates us by showing us how to
read objects, so Ngai might show
us the direction to liberate ourselves
by helping us read our judgments.
Hers is a fascinating combination of critical theory with Cavell’s
focus on Kantian aesthetics, and,
although she does not mention
Hannah Arendt, her approach
would be worthy of Arendt’s work
from Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963)
on. Arendt ended her life working
on Immanuel Kant’s Critique of
Judgment (Critik der Urtheilskraft,
1790), wanting to understand—
after Adolf Eichmann’s banal
evil—how people keep alive a
sense of meaning in the absence of
clear rules to guide us. Ngai argues
that in today’s round of capitalist
restructuring—a period stretching roughly from the onset of
post-Fordism to today, but whose
aesthetic judgments were forming
from the end of the Second World
War on—three forms of aesthetic
judgment betray the formal contradictions of being a subject in
capitalism. These three forms help
us grasp where and how we are.
Yet they are all so minor or paradoxical as to be aliens to the high
tradition of post-Kantian aesthetics with its emphasis on the beautiful and the sublime. They are
alien to Kant’s inheritors in twentieth-century art criticism at the
time of high American modernism—for example, surrounding
the New York School and Clement
Greenberg. Nonetheless, not only

ON OUR AESTHETIC CATEGORIES
do these minor judgments reveal
our present situation, but they contain the possibility of being radicalized in ways that can liberate
subjects within the very conditions
of our alienation.3 The three forms
of judgment are the cute, the interesting, and the zany. By showing
how we have shifted from major
to minor in common sensibilities,
they help us consider how we have
been thrown back on ourselves
and focus the need for a dialectical
counter throw.
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of being potentially powerful over
things when we are often actually
at their mercy. Taking something
as cute displays a caste of mind that
has internalized the contradictory
nature of commodities in contemporary capitalism: these objects
matter to the market more than we
do, but, in order to extract value
from people, they must appear
helpless and affectionate, recalling a
more humanized way of life while
allowing us to feel that we could
participate in dominating, that we
are agents rather than victims.

Cute, Interesting, Zany
Interesting
Cute
According to Ngai, to think that
something is cute is to make an aesthetic judgment that displays the
contradictory nature of commodification in contemporary capitalism.
Things taken to be cute cover over
our social disconnection from each
other in a highly competitive and
individualized world through the
sentimental promise of affection
and—at the same time—allow us
to retain a surplus of power over
the cute object. That gives us a way
to feel the potential of dominating
something without thinking that
we are being dominating. In other
words, to judge that something is
cute is both to push away that we
have become objects in capitalism,
recalling for an instant the warmth
of affection, and to have the illusion

To Ngai, to claim that something
is interesting is to insert oneself into
the logic of circulation.4 Marking
something as interesting makes
discourse itself circulate, mirroring
the underlying flux of capitalist circulation, a world where everything
is sought as a potential source of
value and where “everything solid
melts into air” in a general mixing of meanings around the globe.
The contradiction in the mentality
of the interesting is found in the
possibility that whatever is interesting could be merely interesting—that is, not really interesting
at all. With the aesthetic category
of the interesting, Ngai identifies the opportunism of subjects in
scoring value or being able to walk
away from their failure to attract
interest. Moreover, she locates the
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ambivalence and precariousness of
the oscillation between value and
valuelessness, the risk of collapse in
value that characterizes the speedily circulating logic of capitalism
with its urgent opportunism and
global shuffling. The mindedness
of those who rely on the interesting
is an opportunistic form of defensiveness, allowing them to flicker
around a potentially attractive
site of meaning only to withdraw
quickly if it fails to attract, like a
snake smelling with its tongue.
Zany
Whereas the cute displays a mind
mirroring the contradictions of
commodification and the interesting displays a mind mirroring the opportunism of valuing
that accelerates the circulation of
value-seeking around the globe,
to call something zany is to enter
into the contradictions of contemporary capitalist labor, or
what Ngai calls “performance.”
According to Ngai, objects and
people can be cute or interesting, but only people can be zany.
Zaniness is a judgment about
agency. When we find, for example, Lucy from I Love Lucy (1951–
57) zany, we recognize in her both
the hyperbolic pressure to perform at an absurdly high level of
productivity or effectiveness and
the possibility that her life is an
imminent train wreck, that her

hyperbolic activity is potentially
self-destructive. Finding her over
the top—insanely productive and
bad news—one might hold her
at bay, isolate her, by calling her
zany. Zaniness is a stigmatizing
judgment. What it allows a subject to do is both to recognize the
hyperbolic pressures to perform
even against one’s comfort zone
and to give oneself an out around
those whose efforts make their
lives implode—not an uncommon
class of people in the labor force
(academics not excluded). As with
the cute and the interesting, the
mentality of those who judge others zany displays a defensiveness
around capitalism’s formal contradictions. Here lives the aesthetics of the defended.

***
Ngai’s work offers a significant advance in the tradition of
Benjamin, because it explores the
way mind mirrors world. To examine the utopian contradictions of
the object, as Benjamin did, is not
to delineate how the mind mirrors the object-world. Ngai begins
to do that through her analysis of
forms of judgment. And more than
simply mirroring the object, her
account accommodates some of the
most dominant forms of the entire
economy: commodification, valuing (or value liquidity), and labor.

ON OUR AESTHETIC CATEGORIES
Flow of the Chapters
Ngai’s introduction lays out a
clearly delineated thesis, spends
some time defining her three aesthetic categories, and locates her
work within both the tradition of
postmodern cultural criticism and
the lineage of Cavellian explorations of judgment. As I’ve already
said, I find that her work—while
clearly drawing on what she
learned from Cavell about Kant’s
account of judgment—is actually
better suited to Arendt.
Each of the three main chapters
of Ngai’s book illuminates in depth
one of her aesthetic categories. Her
first chapter on the cute examines
the concept and its history through
a hilarious argument by which
she shows how the avant-garde
is indebted to the cute. Ranging
from everyday children’s toys (with
pictures) to the history of dolls
in the late nineteenth century to
Takashi Murakami’s DOB figures
that explode into violence, Ngai
explores the claims about the cute
that I rehearsed earlier with running dialogue ranging from J. L.
Austin to Theodor Adorno, Karl
Schlegel, and Kant to Karl Marx,
Fredric Jameson, and Benjamin
to Gertrude Stein, Robert Creeley,
and William Carlos Williams. By
interpreting disparate cultural phenomena, she shows that, indeed,
the judgment that something is
cute appears to mirror some important and contradictory formal
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characteristics of life-with-commodities in contemporary capitalism. This interpretation does not
exclude that there are other possible
ways of interpreting what’s under
question, but shows the usefulness
of the interpretation to helping us
navigate our form of life.
A similar pattern shapes her last
two chapters on the merely interesting and on zaniness. The central
focus of her chapter on the interesting is an extended discussion of
the rise of conceptual art in the late
1960s. And the central focus of her
chapter on the zany is the depiction
of over-the-top comedic characters
in contemporary mass media—
from Lucille Ball in the still rerunning I Love Lucy or Richard Pryor’s
character in The Toy (1982) to Jim
Carrey’s The Cable Guy (1996) or
Crazy Eddie. As a setup, too, Ngai
gives an abbreviated genealogy of
the zanni, the character from comedia dell’arte that gave us the idea
of zaniness. Along the way, we are
treated to a circus of philosophers,
literary critics, poets, artists, and
social theorists. Sometimes, the
parade is merely interesting; more
often, it borders on being zany, but
mainly it is fascinating.
The book concludes with an
afterword, not a conclusion, since
Ngai’s chapters have adequately
shown her introductory theses to
be plausible and effective. Here,
Ngai takes stock of aesthetic theory
today and argues that contemporary aesthetic experience is not
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barren—as those who remain wedded to the centrality of the beautiful
and the sublime might think—but
rather that aesthetic theory is. Ngai
wants to diversify aesthetic theory
through marginal and actual categories of everyday judgment.
Although she doesn’t call it such,
this is inching toward Georg Hegel
after Kant, toward the analysis of a
concrete community and its intertwined, axiological forms. Good
stuff.

Other Uses of the Aesthetic
Of course, Ngai’s neo-Kantian
work is not the only kind of work
in aesthetics today. Ngai seems
unaware of a number of cogent
critiques of the entire notion of
the aesthetic, whether Karsten
Harries’s historical deconstruction
of aesthesis in The Ethical Function
of Architecture (1998) or the most
conceptually compelling work I’ve
encountered on the meaning of art,
Lauren Tillinghast’s work, found
in her dissertation “The Thought
of Art” (2000) and in a few select
essays she wrote before becoming a
philosophical counselor. Tillinghast
argues, convincingly, that to call
something “art” invokes a logical category similar to the kind of
“gear switch” Michael Thompson
explores in relation to life, action,
and practice.5 This form of judgment is grounded in the norms

of making, not an experience.
Consequently, to approach objects
through the analysis of forms of
experience is not to approach art.
It’s to do something else—social–
economic critique, in Ngai’s case.
Still, Ngai’s approach is welcome because of how it helps us
understand ourselves in our social
and economic contradictions. It
also helps us tarry with the negative. Ngai’s aesthetics has the merit
of acknowledging—to use Cavell’s
word—the dense conflict in commonly shared forms of mind and
life and in trying to understand,
very much as Arendt did, under
what conditions people might be
able to have independent minds
keyed to common life and its main,
social challenges. In this way, Ngai
has done work to help us further
understand the banality of evil, a
world where suffering is “interesting” and masochism is “cute,”
where pathetic self-destruction is
“zany.”

Avoiding Commitment
My only substantial criticism is
this: in examining the forms of
mindedness that mirror the economy of contemporary capitalism,
Ngai neglects the role of moral
subjectivity. Ngai draws us a compelling portrait of contemporary
consciousness while missing the
extent to which she has also shown

ON OUR AESTHETIC CATEGORIES
us a particular kind of desperate
subject, moreover, a subject who,
if she were to be accountable to
her moral relationships, might
approach the experiences of what
she calls “cute,” “interesting,” or
“zany” differently. She might, for
instance, see these aesthetic judgments as moments on the way to
reconnecting with what is innocent
(and so to be protected), absorbing
(so to be pursued regardless of the
bored chatter around one), and outraging (and so to be taken as a cause
of human dignity worth standing
for). In effect, Ngai’s categories
hold only if the subject using them
is herself uncommitted to moral
experience. This is a form of what
Bernard Williams called “amoralism.” Ngai assumes “amoral”
subjects.6 Isn’t that begging the
question?
Still, as a way to show us the
amoralism of capitalism, I believe
that Ngai is right to begin with
common forms of judgment that
reveal fundamentally amoral or
desperate subjects—subjects who
have lost their grip on what matters in life. But she should not stop
there. The omission of Kierkegaard
from her discussion of the interesting in chapter 2 is perhaps the
only major scholarly oversight of
her book. It is an interesting one
because, if she were to have discussed Kierkegaard’s extremely
thorough
engagement
with
Schlegel and the Athenaeum circle,
she would have had to modify the
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core of her book, which presents, so
to speak, the negative—that is, our
world’s formation of our judgment
as a lack, an orbit around a void
that keeps us avoiding what we
lack. But as Kierkegaard explored
so well in Either/Or (1843), Stages
on Life’s Way (1845), The Concept
of Anxiety (1844), and The Sickness
unto Death (1849), the ironic form
of the judgment of the interesting
is contained not in the quicksilver
nature of its oscillation between
boredom and fascination, but in the
way it both covers and yet delivers
over the capacity of each of us to
develop moral conviction—that is,
to become accountable and real, not
fake or sold-out, people.
Ngai should return to the core
of the subject, in Charles Larmore’s
sense,7 a self capable of commitment, of living for what she finds
valuable. Here is idealism, in the
moral sense. A being who comes
to recall the helplessness and affectionateness of living beings even
through contact with representations in inert things and who is
committed to the values of help and
affection will see in the cute a distorted or semiserious recollection
of the innocent, who deserve protection from abuse. Someone who sees
the interest in something and who is
committed to truth (to getting to the
bottom of why something is interesting) will see in the merely interesting an object of fascination to be
pursued, deeper and deeper so long
as it reveals, until she is absorbed
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in really understanding it.8 And
the agent who witnesses the overwrought efforts of someone trying to perform in capitalism and
who is committed to human agency
will see in that sight not zany comedy but potential tragedy. She will
instinctively move toward action,
challenging the dominance of economic valuation and reasoning
where agents become parodies of
themselves running after productivity instead of having the opportunity to flourish.9
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NOTES
1. Michael Clune, American Literature and
the Free Market, 1945–2000, Cambridge
Studies in American Literature and
Culture (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 55–56. Clune
is discussing Frank O’Hara’s “Personal
Poem” (1964).
2. Aristotle would have said that the form
of the angel—for instance, that worked
into the iron press—was the formal

cause of the material thing. Expanding
the thing’s phenomenality to include
its orbit of meaning, the way it makes
meaning appear in its context, and so
what context it carries with it, is to look
toward Martin Heidegger’s transposition of Aristotle’s formal cause in
Heidegger’s understanding of a thing:
the constellation of a zone through
which phenomena arise. Here, the
zone is one of capitalist production and
reproduction. Phenomena arise shaped
by the contradictions of capitalism, carrying their form.
3. I use “alienation” in a different sense
than Karl Marx did. I consider it a possible feature of the subject’s relation to
what she values, not simply a laborer’s
relation to the objects of his labor.
4. To be precise, she claims the interesting
concerns the circulation of information. Hence, she means to pick up this
category as mirroring the information
economy that has formed contemporary capitalism, “postmodernism,”
and global restructuring according
to Manuel Castells in The Rise of the
Network Society, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
MA: Blackwell, 2000). However, I
think her claim can be broadened, as
she sometimes speaks, to take in circulation generally. It is the circulation of
value—itself the primary kind of information—that matters in capitalism.
5. Michael Thompson, Life and Action:
Elementary Structures of Practice Life
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2008); Lauren Tillinghast, “The
Thought of Art” (PhD diss., University
of Chicago, 2000); and Karsten Harries,
The Ethical Function of Architecture
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
6. Bernard Williams, Morality: An
Introduction to Ethics, Canto Classics
(New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 3–13. In my terminology,
she assumes subjects without ethics,
with the consequence that these subjects
are then likely to be morally ambivalent. The domain of the moral is the
domain of interpersonal responsibility.

ON OUR AESTHETIC CATEGORIES
The ethical is broader, taking in all that
is of value in terms of a good life.
7. Charles Larmore, The Practices of the
Self (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2010).
8. In what is one of her most interesting
minor arguments that I have not gone
into here, Ngai argues that the flip side
of the merely interesting is the invitation
to others to come join one in discussion about what is interesting. This is
the moment when she rearticulates,
as a process, the sensus communis of
Kant. The argument is ingenious on
a number of levels, not the least in the
way it notices the “purposive purposelessness” of aesthetic judgment in Kant
and aligns it with the “inter-esse” (being
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driven between things) of discussion,
rather than with “dis-interest,” which
Kant sticks to when conceptualizing the
aesthetic mind. Ngai could write a short
book—a long essay—examining just this
tension in Kant and letting it develop
in her own terms, probably away from
Kant toward Hegel or Arendt. Here
would be the subject standing in the
locus of ethos giving sense and meaning
to the world, to echo the wording of
Anne-Christine Habbard.
9. To be fair to Ngai, she said in e-mail
correspondence that my reading of
what is unsaid in her book both coheres
with what she would want to explore
further and is something toward which
she is initially disposed.

